TheAgitator.com
The Case For Cutting and Running
Thursday, November 6th, 2003In the past few weeks or so, Old and New Medialand alike have been full of solemn, pious pronouncements about how the US occupying forces in Iraq must “finish the job,” and how they must, above all, not just get out as quickly as possible. From right-wingers (and, certainly, from Bush in his latest “forward strategy for democracy” speech) this tends to come across as chest-puffing neo-Wilsonianism; from left-wingers, including many who opposed the war, it’s a reluctant, sighing, “Bush got us into this mess and now we have to buck up and deal with it” sort of thing. But across the spectrum there is nothing but condemnation of the “cut and run” option.
Well, I think they’re all wrong. I think cutting and running– by which I mean: staying just long enough to finally find and kill Saddam, then ending the “nation-building” effort in Iraq, drawing down forces there to much lower levels, and redirecting overall military strategy back to fighting al-Qaeda– is the best of the (admittedly awful) options. It would save us loads of blood and treasure, get us out of a corrupt, doomed business, and set us on the road back to non-interventionism, a road we’ve got to get back on for the long term anyway. It is extremely unlikely to happen anytime soon, since it would require an enormous about-face from the current administration, but hey, how can you be a libertarian without advocating things that are extremely unlikely to happen anytime soon?
Let me address, then, a few of the common anti-cut-and-run arguments.
1. We owe it to the Iraqis to reconstruct their country, since we bombed and invaded them in the first place. For one thing, the whole idea of national obligations reeks of collectivism. Individuals owe things to other individuals; nations owe nothing to nations. In particular, those of us who opposed the war from the beginning don’t owe it to anyone to be taxed to pay for the consequences of others’ folly.
But suppose you buy the national-responsibility premise. You are still left with that great universal axiom of moral theory: ought implies can. Where is the evidence that we can make a prosperous, free, modern democracy out of Iraq? I do hope Germany and Japan have been well and truly discredited by now as historical parallels; Iraq has neither Reichstag nor Emperor, and on the culturally-ingrained-obedience and ethnic-homogeneity scales it’s just about at the opposite end from those happy exceptions. And they are exceptions; the US has occupied lots and lots of Third World countries, for varying times and in varying ways, over the last century, and never produced a single successful democratization-from-scratch. Nor has anybody else. History is littered with the bones of failed uplifters and civilizers.
Staying the course in a futile effort is not honorable; it’s just bullheaded. There is no moral value to bullheadedness.
2. If we pull out of Iraq, it will become a haven for terrorists. Maybe so. But what the heck is it now, then? Given the ease with which various insurgent fighters are apparently able to move around, it’s hard to see what good the occupation is doing on that score.
It’s even harder to see what good the occupation does that couldn’t be done by a much smaller force dedicated specifically to rooting out al-Qaeda activity– not policing, not reconstruction, just trying to keep a lid on the guys who actually threaten us. The current troop contingent in Afghanistan seems to be doing something like this, and while Afghanistan is an irremediably awful mess, at least it’s not the secure al-Qaeda op center it was before 9/11. I can’t believe I’m advocating an “Afghanistan strategy” here, but like I said, all options suck right now.
3. Pulling out of Iraq will embolden our enemies by demonstrating to them our lack of resolve. This is a very good argument for hunting down and killing Saddam Hussein. It’s an even better argument for hunting down and killing Osama bin Laden and Mullah Omar (remember them?) It’s not a good argument for staying on in an adventure of the sort that tends to make us enemies in the first place, and draws off resources from the aforementioned hunting down and killing.
The message we ought to be sending to terrorists and rogue leaders is “If you attack Americans, you, personally, are toast.” The message we are now sending is “If you think about maybe acquiring the means to attack Americans at some point in the indefinite future, we will invade your country and spend lots of our resources making your people even more resentful of us than they were before, thereby aiding your propaganda efforts.”
The anti-emboldening folks like to cite what happened in Lebanon twenty years ago as an example. Well, the Israelis stayed in Lebanon after we cut and run that time. They stayed for seventeen grindingly horrible years. They had one significant part of the population naturally allied to them and another naturally hostile, just as we have in Iraq. And they had a much more direct security interest in staying: they were trying to keep a terrorist haven from operating right on their borders.
Three years ago they finally gave up and left. What good did all their resolve do them? What good did it do the Lebanese? What good will it do us to repeat their mistake?
“In particular, those of us who opposed the war from the beginning don’t owe it to anyone to be taxed to pay for the consequences of others’ folly.”
In general you don’t owe it to anyone to be taxed to pay for anything.
My brother works with a lot of Marines in the defense industry. Apparently there is a phrase among Marines: “Poor planning on your part does not constitute a crisis on my part.”
Love it. Let’s get our troops OUT THE FUCK of Iraq ASAP.
Chop Chop
Over at Radleyâs place, Nick Weininger valiantly lays out the case for cutting and running in Iraq. Iâm glad he did and I bet others will follow. There arenât many sensible people who truly believe that Iraq will turn into…
If you want to bring historically precedent into it, since when has the US been able to back up:
“If you attack Americans, you, personally, are toast.” I think if anything, recent events have shown that our military and intelligence fails when it tries to take down an individual, or small group. In Iraq we own the country, have a massive bounty on Saddam’s head, and he still is free. In Afghanistan, bin Ladan, who at 9 feet tall (or whatever) he should be pretty easy to find, and from his latest video, he hasn’t changed his appearance at all. Now I’m not sure, what the answer is here. While I did and still do support the war in Iraq (always for reasons besides the WMD line), it should be clear to everyone that full scale war is not a sustainable foreign policy. Until our intelligence industry can deliver the “you personally are toast” threat just makes us look like an ass. So what is left? Is there a third way? Maybe we have to just wait for the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud and then respond in kind.
Superb post, Nick.
Now, how do we get you posting more often?
Thanks, Radley.
As for how to get me posting more often: well, you could prove some theorems in probabilistic combinatorics, and then write my thesis for me.
It surprises me that someone writing a thesis on probabilistic combinatorics uses little smiley-face emoticons.
Intervention? We did not start this war: 9-11, U.S.S. Cole, ext., ext., ext. There was never a question if Sadam had WMD; the question is where are they now. If Iraq is a hot bead of terrorists then great. We are there and we will get them.
I think our military should leave Germany before it leaves Iraq. We are going to finish the job this time, just like we did in Germany. Just donât let the politicians run this war.
Ignoring terrorism till it goes away is not a policy we can afford.
http://www.iht.com/articles/115494.html
http://interestalert.com/brand/siteia.shtml?Story=st/sn/10290000aaa030d6.upi&Sys=rmmiller&Fid=NATIONAL&Type=News&Filter=National%20News
Quick point: To analyze history by the end result is misleading and inaccurate. Japan and Germany are annomalies not because the end result was unique, but also because of the intentions of the US going into the projects. The intent of the US was never to stay longer than necessary nor to use Japan and Germany as puppet states. This is what makes them unique. To say that the end result is what makes them unique is to put the cart in front of the horse.
In the case of Iraq, the intent is the same. I am not saying the results will be the same because this is a different country, different culture, and a different era. But to outrightly dismiss the parallels between Japan, Germany, and Iraq seems to me to be a bit amateurish. Let’s get beyond the surface-level analysis.
Nick,
Aren’t we staying because of the oil? Not that I agree, mind you, but here’s the line of reasoning:
Two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are in the middle east, with the Saudis controlling 25% and Iraq 10%. The key is Saudi Arabia - the only true swing producer of oil in the world. No amount of exploration in the rest of the world (incl. Russia, Canada or the ANWR) can or will change that dynamic. Not now and not 30 years from now. So, the US needs a friendly state in the middle east as an insurance policy in the event of a disruption in supply from Saudi Arabia. Given the uncertain future of the Saudi Govt, the administration believes this insurance policy is worth buying. The royal saudi family - pro-american - is very unpopular with fundamental Islamists in the country; and there’s no clear line of succession for Crown Prince Adbullah, the defacto ruler. So, when the Saudi govt collapses or is taken over by “unfriendlies”, US friendly Iraq steps up production temporarily until a) Saudi production is restored or b) we “get into them thar arab lands and kick some butt…”.
Again, not that I agree, but I think the Administration believes an $80bn insurance policy is worth buying to preserve the flow of cheap oil.
I’m not analyzing history by the end result. I’m saying Japan and Germany were unique because of the conditions that prevailed there, not the intent of the occupiers. I think intent matters little if at all. Besides, when *hasn’t* a US occupying force claimed it would stay “no longer than necessary”, or claimed that democratization and Westernization constituted at least part of the intent of the occupation?
Drake, good points all. “See no evil, hear no evil” is clearly not the answer here.
Also, Nick, our occupation of Iraq is much more similar to Germany and Japan than to the endless third-world countries you seem to think we occupy. We came in full-force, beat the crap out of who was there, and are currently stabilizing the place. Give our troops more than a couple months before you declare the peace unwinnable and tell our army to run away crying like a little girl. Should we really allow another dictator to come in and ruin any and all hope we have on stabilizing the region? The reason extremists are able to recruit members is because those member’s standard of living is shit and they blame it on Americans. What happens when we drastically improve the lives of Iraqis? The bombers run out of people willing to die to stop progress. And that is the goal of the war on terror, cut off the arms and legs (the minions of terrorist groups), and the body may not die, but it won’t be capable of much.
It seems like all of Nicks arguments boil down to;â Its hard and there aren’t any guarantees so I donât like itâ. Iâm currently working through trying to explain that this is true of many situations in life with my 14 year old. She is catching on to the fact that this doesnât preclude putting in the effort, and at least trying.
I would postulate that the true underpinning of the pro-engagement “debate” is emotional rather than logical. The fierce international criticism of the war has served, it is my belief, to touch our pride. It’s rare to see such a unanimity of opinion in America between the right and left. I attribute it to a common and undebated understanding that America as a nation needs to prove the doubters wrong.
I would point to some of the posters as evidence for my postulation. They avoid Nick’s excellent logic entirely and proceed to call him a wimp. This is why there is no real force arguing for disengagement - public figures prefer to avoid being called wimps, rightly or wrongly.
What you get is a complex debate over what the reasons for staying are, and over sub-strategies that fit comfortably under the engagement umbrella. That debate serves to provide a patina of logic and reason for the enterprise as a whole.
Calling people cowards for positing unpopular positions, or for logically outlining the alternatives to emotionally favored policies, serves to bleach our Democratic debate of meaning and substance.
Please, Nick, keep up the good work.
Jeb: again, the way we came in is less important in my mind than the character of the place itself. And I’m not suggesting that the army “run away crying like a little girl”; I’m suggesting that it go back to pursuing people who actually threaten the security of American citizens, rather than trying to stabilize a region whose stability ought not be our business. The less involved we are in the politics of the region, the less inclined people will be to blame their problems on us.
mudflap: there’s a difference between hard-but-worthwhile and hard-and-probably-futile. In life, the former category consists mostly of things that at least some others have a good record of doing successfully before, even if they required plenty of effort.
Reconstructing Iraq does not fit this criterion; history is substantially against us here. Nor do we have any radically new tools for succeeding where others have failed.
Knowing when a hard thing is worth doing, and when you should just walk away, is indeed a crucial component of adult intelligence; but a failure to recognize the latter type of situation can be just as damaging as a failure to recognize the former.
Okay, if history is full of misadventures in nation-building on the scale we see in Iraq then it must be gorged with examples of the hit-and-run type of policy you advocate.
I can name far more examples of how your policy of hit-and-run has failed compared to a rebuilding policy. If we’re going to look to history for an indication of what to do in Iraq, then I think history is BY FAR on the side of sticking around and mending fences.
This is certainly not a guarantee of success on the level of Europe or Japan because, as you said, Iraq is different. But the difference does not necessarily equate to disaster.
While we are bandying historical models about, we need to find an accurate one, and Germany/Japan clearly are not.
What is missing in Iraq, first and foremost, is nationalism: A sense of national unity, shared cultural values and norms, widespread acceptence of the legitimacy of the state, and identification with the organizations created to run the place.
Iraq is not a nation state, as Germany and Japan (and what we call The West) it is barely a country. Really, it is a place, with two oil wells and three hostile tribes stapled hastily together by the british foreign office. There are no “Iraqis” to work with, there was no “Iraqi Army” to defeat, and no one living there believes that he, personally, was militarily defeated and needs to get a clue. All these factors were present in Germany and Japan, they are all absent in Iraq.
A closer analogy would be the Phillipines.
I don’t really think there is an inverse relationship between less troops and a democratic Iraq, anyway. The more colonial we become–the more we blindly throw more troops at the problem–the more dependent Iraqis become upon us for their security. At some point Iraqis of good conscience must take responsibility for the direcion their nation will take, and there is no better way to do so than to sink or swim. U.S. troops can draw back to perimeter posts and assist with special ops and lightening strike attacks as needed.
The notion that this is the “bad” is relative: The fight against terrorism is better off for having one less state sponsor. Afghanistan was not a haven for int’l terrorism UNTIL the Taliban completed their takeover and constituted a governing state. If Iraq becomes like Afghanistan it is bad for the Iraqi people of good conscience–but not as bad as if they had never had an opportunity to take their country back–but not apparantly bad from a security standpont for the U.S.
By “like Afghanistan” in above post I mean like pre-Taliban Afghanistan: i.e., a basket case. From a security standpont, Somalia and pre-Taliban Afghanistan (or post Taliban-Afghanistan) are better risk-wise than either N. Korea, Baath-rule Iraq, Taliban-ruled Afghanistan or Syria or any other constituted state capable of organized sponsorship of terrorist proxies. Hence I think raising the specter of terrorism if Iraq falls into “chaos” is simply misplaced.
Yes, and… Iraqis “of good concience” cannot assume responsibility because there are no Iraqis to begin with. There are Kurds, Shiia Muslims and Sunni Muslims who have nothing in common beside our assumptions.
Stability in a place like that can only come in three ways:
1.) Partition
2.) External Rule
3.) Strongman
Anything else will devolve into Yugoslavia.
Someone change the channel, this Iraq this is taking way too long — isn’t 8 months long enough to invade and ensure a peaceful transfer of power?
Geez.
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