You know, you’d think someone who was vocally pro-war — especially a self-described pro-war libertarian — would by now be exhibiting at least a little contrition, introspection, and — just maybe — regret. You’d at least think a pro-war libertarian would be toning down the rhetoric a bit, given that after 2,500 dead U.S. troops, thousands of dead Iraqis, and a projected price tag of $1 trillion U.S. tax dollars, Iraq is descending into civil war, and it’s not at all clear that the war made U.S. or Iraqi civilians any safer.

Nah.

Instead, “neolibertarian” (which, I gather, means “mistrust of government at home, near-religious-like faith in government abroad) Dale Franks is lashing out at war critics — me, by name — for…um…not being prescient.

This might take the prize for the lamest and most esoteric of criticisms yet hurled by the pro-war crowd. Putting aside for a moment the weird, deflective nature of the criticism (”Hey, I may have been catastrophically wrong, but you failed to perfectly predict the future!”), I’m not even certain it’s accurate.

In the post in which I first explained my opposition to the war, for example, I wrote:

Does Iraq present a “threat” to our national security?

I’m pretty convinced now that the answer is no.

I’d say yes if I could see definitive proof of an al-Queda or a 9/11 connection. I’d say yes if I could see definitive proof that Iraq had nuclear capabilities and had plans to put them into action. I’d say yes if I could see definitive proof that Saddam’s own sense of self-preservation and survival were overwhelmed by his hatred of the United States. But to be honest, I haven’t yet seen proof of any of these.

[...]

The lust for war I think has blinded many libertarians of their natural distrust for government. Why are blogosphere libertarians suddenly so quick to believe the Bush administration when it says “we’ve got the evidence–trust us”� Why aren’t we demanding to see it? Have we already forgotten that our government has — in the past, on occasion, from time to time, in matters of war – lied to us? Aren’t we at least a little troubled when a report comes out of the CIA that draws conclusions counter to the war effort is suddenly played down by that agency’s politically-appointed director, under pressure from the White House? Where’s the healthy skepticism?

I don’t know. But that sounds sorta’ prescient, doesn’t it?

Franks dismisses my pre-war skepticism as “philosophical,” not “substantive.” As Jim Henley notes, the two aren’t mutually exclusive. To Jim’s comments, I’d add….huh? I don’t really even know what that means. I’m not averse to war when war is necessary. But it should be necessary. And it should be limited to eradicating the people who’ve attacked us, not rebuilding and atoning afterward.

Thus, I didn’t think the war with Iraq was necessary because (a) I wasn’t convinced Iraq was a threat (I was right), (b) I was concerned about the Bush administration’s motivations (we’ll probably never know if I was right or not), (c) I didn’t think government was capable of building a liberal society where none has existed for centuries (so far, I was right), and (d) I feared the war and subsequent occupation would spur yet more Muslim hate our way (I was right).

But never mind me. I’m not a foreign policy expert, and don’t claim to be. If Dale wants prescience, he oughtta’ look at what the anti-war libertarians who study this stuff for a living had to say before the war. I’ve already written way too much on this — see my responses to a similar criticism from Ryan Sager here and here. But for Franks’ benefit, I’ll repaste a selection of what Catoites predicted might happen with Iraq alongside what a selection of White House flaks and supporters predicted.

I’ll let Franks be the judge of who was and wasn’t “prescient.”

Click “more.”

First, from Catoites:

“In the words of one Iraqi: ‘We thank the Americans for getting rid of Saddam’s regime, but now Iraq must be run by Iraqis.’ To prevent that gratitude from turning to resentment and hostility, we must have the wisdom to leave as quickly as possible. If we don’t, the United States runs the risk of reliving its experience in Lebanon in the 1980s. Or worse, our own version of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan — Arabs and Muslims from the region could flock to Iraq to expel the American infidel.”

–Charles V. Pena, May 8, 2003.

“Promoters of nation-building in Iraq, including many who scorned similar efforts by a Democratic administration a few years ago, point to nation-building successes in Germany and Japan following World War II. Along these same lines, Bush declared that ‘[r]ebuilding Iraq will require a sustained commitment’ and that the United States would ‘remain in Iraq as long as necessary, and not a day more.’ But there are still more than 70,000 U.S. troops in Germany and 50,000 in Japan, and this lingering troop presence has given rise to a virulent anti-Americanism. If these ’success’ stories reflect the model for post-war Iraq, we should expect U.S. troops to remain in this troubled region for many years.”

–Christopher Preble, March 4, 2003

“In the absence of strong allies and regional bases, the successful prosecution of another war in Iraq may be more costly in time, lives and resources than the Gulf War.”

–William Niskanen, December 31, 2001

“Another war in Iraq may serve bin Laden’s objective of unifying radical Muslims around the world in a jihad against the United States, increasing the number of anti-U.S. terrorists. In contrast, the Sept. 11 attacks and the successful prosecution of the war in Afghanistan have divided the Muslim political elite.”

–Niskanen

“American popular support may not be sufficient to prosecute a sustained war against Saddam.”

–Niskanen

“Yet no matter how emotionally satisfying removing a thug like Saddam may seem, Americans would be wise to consider whether that step is worth the price. The inevitable U.S. military victory would not be the end of America’s troubles in Iraq. Indeed, it would mark the start of a new round of headaches. Ousting Saddam would make Washington responsible for Iraq’s political future and entangle the United States in an endless nation-building mission beset by intractable problems.”

–Ted Galen Carpenter, January 14, 2002

“If Iraq’s forces don’t quickly crumble, the U.S. might find itself involved in urban conflict that will be costly in human and political terms.”

–Doug Bandow, August 12, 2002

“The Gulf War Cost $80 billion (in 2002 dollars). Because the United States would probably be faced with a long occupation of Iraq to stabilize the country after the invasion, the cost is likely to be higher this time around. And unlike the Gulf War, no financial support from other nations can be expected to defray the costs.”

–Ivan Eland, August 19, 2002

“The MacArthur Regency worked in Japan because the U.S. occupiers entered a country sick to death of war, with a tradition of deference to authority…

…That process is particularly unlikely to be repeated in Iraq, a fissiparous amalgam of Sunnis, separatist Shiites and Kurds. Keeping the country together will require a strong hand and threatens to make U.S. servicemen walking targets for discontented radicals.”

–Gene Healy, January 1, 2003

“My best guess is that war and its aftermath would be more costly and difficult than the optimists admit. The fact that presidential adviser Larry Lindsey publicly estimates it would cost $100 billion to $200 billion implies the administration expects a second Iraq war to be two or three times more difficult than the first one.”

–Alan Reynolds, November 21, 2002.

Now, from the war’s defenders:

“The United States is committed to helping Iraq recover from the conflict, but Iraq will not require sustained aid.”

–OMB Director Mitch Daniels, quote in the Washington Post on April 21, 2003.

“Well, the Office of Management and Budget, has come up come up with a number that’s something under $50 billion for the cost. How much of that would be the U.S. burden, and how much would be other countries, is an open question.”

–Donald Rumsfeld, January 19, 2003.

“Costs of any [Iraq] intervention would be very small.”

–White House economic advisor Glen Hubbard, October 4, 2002.

“Iraq has tremendous resources that belong to the Iraqi people. And so there are a variety of means that Iraq has to be able to shoulder much of the burden for their own reconstruction.”

–Ari Fleischer, February 18, 2003.

“We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.”

–Paul Wolfowitz, March 27, 2003.

“A year from now, I’ll be very surprised if there is not some grand square in Baghdad that is named after President Bush.”

–Richard Perle, September 22, 2003.

“I expect we will get a lot of mitigation [from other countries re: the cost of rebuilding Iraq], but it will be easier after the fact than before the fact.”

–Paul Wolfowitz, March 27, 2003.

“Some of the higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark.”

–Wolfowitz

“I am reasonably certain that they will greet us as liberators, and that will help us to keep requirements down.”

–Wolfowitz

“Well, I don’t think it’s likely to unfold that way. . . . The read we get on the people of Iraq is there is no question but what they want to the get rid of Saddam Hussein, and they will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do that.”

–Dick Cheney, when asked if the American public is ready for a long, bloody battle, March 16, 2003 (Incidentally, in a mid-May 2004 poll commissioned by the U.S.-led CPA, just 2% of Iraqis viewed U.S. troops as “liberators”).

“I don’t think it would be that tough a fight.”

–Cheney.

“There are other differences that suggest that peacekeeping requirements in Iraq might be much lower than historical experience in the Balkans suggests.”

–Wolfowitz, February 27, 2003

“Bring ‘em on. We’ve got the force necessary to deal with the security situation.”

–President Bush, when asked if the insurgency and resulting U.S. casualties might cause him to ask for more help from U.S. allies, July 2, 2003.

This entry was posted on Thursday, August 10th, 2006 at 9:30 am by Radley Balko and is filed under Uncategorized. You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. Both comments and pings are currently closed.