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Wrong.

That comes via the Spending Clause, through which Congress bribes the States with federal highway money if and only if they adopt certain standards. See also, “Click It or Ticket” and the brouhaha (sp?) over requiring colleges to allow ROTC recruiters on their campuses.

Many states tried in vain to restrict the distribution of alcohol in the latter part of the 19th century. They came up against a Supreme Court that repeatedly held that the dormant commerce clause restricted the power of states to prohibit various forms of alcohol distribution. The states would then lobby congress to pass various laws aimed at mitigating the effect of the dormant commerce clause on state alcohol legislation. Each time a new federal law would be passed, alcohol distributors would find a loophole through which they could distribute alcohol with the imprimatur of the dormant commerce clause.

In Rhodes v. Iowa (1898), the Supreme Court struck down an Iowa law that attempted to prohibit mail order shipments of alcohol. As a result, Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act, which prohibited the importation of alcohol into a state in violation of such state’s law. The language of the Webb-Kenyon Act eventually became, after the failure of prohibition, the model for Section 2 of the 21st Amendment to the Constitution, which prohibits the “transportation or importation into any State … for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof….”

The plain language of the 21st Amendment clearly grants the States the latitude to pass laws restricting the importation of alcohol. The Supreme Court held as much in its original interpretation of the matter in State Board of Equalization v. Young’s Market Co. (1936), in which Justice Brandeis, writing for the majority, scoffed at the notion that the States were limited in their authority to regulate the importation and distribution of alcohol.

The Institute for Justice is taking the position that a judicially-created constitutional doctrine, the dormant commerce clause, trumps an express constitutional provision that was enacted with the aim of mitigating the effect of that very same judicially-created constitutional doctrine. This is a curious position to say the least.

As with any legislation, especially legislation which stands to make people very rich, it can have very nasty effects which don’t bear much resemblance to the glories and miracles that were promised.

I’d have to disagree with that.

Far more likely, it’d work like credit cards. Card issuers flock to states which have modified their usury laws to raise the maximum interest rates that can be charged to customers.

That definitely isn’t to the benefit of consumers. (It seems short-sighted for the bank, as well, seeing as how jacking up rates must surely push people toward filing for bankruptcy. Thus the banks’ interest in bankruptcy ‘reform’, so they cut their risk incurred by making bad loans, while maximizing income from debtors.)

States may create an environment that makes it possible for insurance companies to offer low rates, but they will also pass laws making it easy for insurers to make life hell for their customers. The insurers will do that at the first opportunity.

Customers would have little defense, since people have almost zero leverage, at least in the case of medical coverage.

In theory, yes, states could create a regulatory environment that lowers costs for insurance companies, and the companies could pass those costs on to the customers.

In reality, based on observations of real-world behavior of such companies, I think they’ll pocket the savings and consumers will take it in the ass. Hard.

The Commerce Clause, unfortunately, says what it says — namely that Congress may “regulate Commerce … among the several States” — PERIOD! If it’s interstate commerce, Congress can regulate it — PERIOD (subject only to other Constitutional limitations — more on this below!). There’s simply no “discrimination against out-of-state commerce” in the equation (unfortunately).

I think our noble host may be confusing the Commerce Clause with Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1, Privileges and Immunities, which addresses how a State may treat in-state and out-of-state people and activities differently.

Also, please re-read (we all read the entire Constitution at least once a year, don’t we?) Section 2 of the Twenty-First Amendment. Alcohol is NOT the battlefield upon which to fight this (very good) fight.

And another thing, since when are libertarians “original intent” legal theorists? I think most libertarian causes (if not this particular one) are far more easily supported by “plain language” analysis than by “original intent” … but’s that a whole other thread…