Geez.

Stability in a place like that can only come in three ways:
1.) Partition
2.) External Rule
3.) Strongman

Anything else will devolve into Yugoslavia.

The notion that this is the “bad” is relative: The fight against terrorism is better off for having one less state sponsor. Afghanistan was not a haven for int’l terrorism UNTIL the Taliban completed their takeover and constituted a governing state. If Iraq becomes like Afghanistan it is bad for the Iraqi people of good conscience–but not as bad as if they had never had an opportunity to take their country back–but not apparantly bad from a security standpont for the U.S.

What is missing in Iraq, first and foremost, is nationalism: A sense of national unity, shared cultural values and norms, widespread acceptence of the legitimacy of the state, and identification with the organizations created to run the place.

Iraq is not a nation state, as Germany and Japan (and what we call The West) it is barely a country. Really, it is a place, with two oil wells and three hostile tribes stapled hastily together by the british foreign office. There are no “Iraqis” to work with, there was no “Iraqi Army” to defeat, and no one living there believes that he, personally, was militarily defeated and needs to get a clue. All these factors were present in Germany and Japan, they are all absent in Iraq.

A closer analogy would be the Phillipines.

I can name far more examples of how your policy of hit-and-run has failed compared to a rebuilding policy. If we’re going to look to history for an indication of what to do in Iraq, then I think history is BY FAR on the side of sticking around and mending fences.

This is certainly not a guarantee of success on the level of Europe or Japan because, as you said, Iraq is different. But the difference does not necessarily equate to disaster.

mudflap: there’s a difference between hard-but-worthwhile and hard-and-probably-futile. In life, the former category consists mostly of things that at least some others have a good record of doing successfully before, even if they required plenty of effort.

Reconstructing Iraq does not fit this criterion; history is substantially against us here. Nor do we have any radically new tools for succeeding where others have failed.

Knowing when a hard thing is worth doing, and when you should just walk away, is indeed a crucial component of adult intelligence; but a failure to recognize the latter type of situation can be just as damaging as a failure to recognize the former.

I would point to some of the posters as evidence for my postulation. They avoid Nick’s excellent logic entirely and proceed to call him a wimp. This is why there is no real force arguing for disengagement – public figures prefer to avoid being called wimps, rightly or wrongly.

What you get is a complex debate over what the reasons for staying are, and over sub-strategies that fit comfortably under the engagement umbrella. That debate serves to provide a patina of logic and reason for the enterprise as a whole.

Calling people cowards for positing unpopular positions, or for logically outlining the alternatives to emotionally favored policies, serves to bleach our Democratic debate of meaning and substance.

Please, Nick, keep up the good work.

Also, Nick, our occupation of Iraq is much more similar to Germany and Japan than to the endless third-world countries you seem to think we occupy. We came in full-force, beat the crap out of who was there, and are currently stabilizing the place. Give our troops more than a couple months before you declare the peace unwinnable and tell our army to run away crying like a little girl. Should we really allow another dictator to come in and ruin any and all hope we have on stabilizing the region? The reason extremists are able to recruit members is because those member’s standard of living is shit and they blame it on Americans. What happens when we drastically improve the lives of Iraqis? The bombers run out of people willing to die to stop progress. And that is the goal of the war on terror, cut off the arms and legs (the minions of terrorist groups), and the body may not die, but it won’t be capable of much.

Aren’t we staying because of the oil? Not that I agree, mind you, but here’s the line of reasoning:

Two-thirds of the world’s proven oil reserves are in the middle east, with the Saudis controlling 25% and Iraq 10%. The key is Saudi Arabia – the only true swing producer of oil in the world. No amount of exploration in the rest of the world (incl. Russia, Canada or the ANWR) can or will change that dynamic. Not now and not 30 years from now. So, the US needs a friendly state in the middle east as an insurance policy in the event of a disruption in supply from Saudi Arabia. Given the uncertain future of the Saudi Govt, the administration believes this insurance policy is worth buying. The royal saudi family – pro-american – is very unpopular with fundamental Islamists in the country; and there’s no clear line of succession for Crown Prince Adbullah, the defacto ruler. So, when the Saudi govt collapses or is taken over by “unfriendlies”, US friendly Iraq steps up production temporarily until a) Saudi production is restored or b) we “get into them thar arab lands and kick some butt…”.

Again, not that I agree, but I think the Administration believes an $80bn insurance policy is worth buying to preserve the flow of cheap oil.

In the case of Iraq, the intent is the same. I am not saying the results will be the same because this is a different country, different culture, and a different era. But to outrightly dismiss the parallels between Japan, Germany, and Iraq seems to me to be a bit amateurish. Let’s get beyond the surface-level analysis.

http://www.iht.com/articles/115494.html

http://interestalert.com/brand/siteia.shtml?Story=st/sn/10290000aaa030d6.upi&Sys=rmmiller&Fid=NATIONAL&Type=News&Filter=National%20News